A new Article 9b sets up a facility to buy up to 260 Mt of high-quality international credits from 2036 — letting ETS sectors run −85% domestic, with a hard integrity gate and a fallback that snaps the cap back to −90% if a credible market never shows up.
The EU ETS review reopens a door that has been shut since the Kyoto era: international carbon credits. A new Article 9b — titled “Funding for international credits” — lets the EU buy high-quality credits that count toward the bloc’s climate ambition, starting in 2036.
The legal basis is the European Climate Law, which allows credits as an “adequate contribution” of up to 5% of 1990 net emissions — so the economy can reach −85% domestically and close the gap to the −90% net 2040 target with credits. This proposal channels the EU ETS’s share of that flexibility, and a pilot period may run 2031–2035 ahead of the 2036 start.
As with removals, credits are bought centrally — not by operators. Up to 260 million allowances are set aside from the Union cap and made available to a purchasing facility, which auctions them and uses the proceeds to buy up to 260 Mt of high-quality, high-integrity international credits over 2036–2040, contributing to the ambition of the sectors covered by the ETS.
The proceeds are external assigned revenue, and the auctioning follows the ETS’s normal Article 10(4) rules. Because the credits do part of the work, the ETS runs a gentler post-2036 trajectory — a lower linear reduction factor consistent with −85% domestic rather than −90%. Operators are unaffected in their day-to-day compliance: they keep surrendering EU allowances, while the credits count at system level.
We help project developers and buyers structure Article 6 / high-integrity supply against the EU’s emerging eligibility criteria.
The whole mechanism is conditional. By 31 January 2033, the Commission must report to the Parliament and Council on whether a genuine high-quality, high-integrity international-credit market has developed — assessing environmental integrity, accounting robustness and verification, market supply and demand, and the risks of carbon leakage, lost competitiveness and “mitigation deterrence.” Every purchase must meet the criteria of the Climate Law, and the text notes that the rules developed under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement “may be complemented.”
The fallback
If high-quality, high-integrity, cost-effective credits are not available, the linear reduction factor reverts to 2.7% from 2036, pulling the ETS back onto a −90% domestic trajectory. Any set-aside allowances not used for credits flow to the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. In other words: no credible market, no relaxation.
The 260 Mt is the ETS’s slice of the economy-wide 5% credit allowance. In value terms, international credits trade far below engineered removals: Article 6 units span a wide range by vintage, method and host country, but a €10–50/t planning band puts the facility on the order of €3–13 billion across 2036–2040 — an order of magnitude below the removals programme.
The significance is less the money than the signal: a sovereign, quality-gated EU buyer for Paris-aligned credits, with a defined budget and a statutory integrity bar. That is precisely the creditworthy demand the Article 6 market has lacked.
Three clarifications matter. First, this is not open operator access — operators cannot surrender international credits against their emissions; the facility buys and the credits count at system level. Second, it is not a return to the old CER/ERU regime — the gate is Climate-Law and Article 6 integrity criteria, not raw volume. Third, it is distinct from the permanent-removals programme (Article 9c) and from CORSIA units — three separate channels with separate rules. A dedicated Union law on the use of international credits is expected later in 2026 to set the detailed criteria and safeguards.
For Article 6 project developers and host countries, this is the prize the voluntary market has lacked — a large, creditworthy sovereign buyer with a defined budget. But the demand is contingent: it only materialises if the 2033 report finds a credible market, and every unit must carry corresponding adjustments and clear the EU’s integrity bar. For buyers, the fallback is the tell — if high-integrity supply does not scale, the EU simply tightens domestically instead. Expect the criteria in the forthcoming Union law to decide which methodologies and host countries actually qualify.
The take
International credits are back in EU climate policy — but on a very short leash. The design says the quiet part out loud: the EU wants the cost-efficiency of Paris-aligned credits, but only if a genuinely high-integrity market exists, and it has pre-committed to tightening at home if one does not. For Article 6 developers, the opportunity is real and sizeable, yet it is gated by a 2033 assessment and criteria still being written. Build for integrity and corresponding adjustments now; the buyers — sovereign and voluntary alike — are converging on the same bar.
Primary sources for the figures and rules cited above.
From Article 6 supply structuring to EU eligibility criteria and corresponding adjustments, Climate Decode helps developers and buyers get ahead of the 2033 gate.
Newsletter
Regulatory shifts, market outlooks and new tools from Climate Decode. Work email only — first and last name optional. No spam, unsubscribe anytime.
Subscribe to insights →